unplugged-system/external/ltp/testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/bpf_prog06.c

159 lines
3.8 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (c) 2022 SUSE LLC <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
*/
/*\
* [Description]
*
* ringbuf_submit takes a pointer to a ringbuf record, but not the
* size of this record. The verifier only validates offset ptrs[1] passed
* to functions if the function has a size parameter. So we can
* perform a wide range of ptr arithmetic on this record ptr.
*
* ringbuf_submit updates some data (i.e. the length) in the
* ringbuf header which is calculated from the record ptr. So this can
* be used to corrupt memory.
*
* This test does not try to cause a crash. Howver it does run the
* eBPF if it can. This will result in an instant crash or memory
* corruption which may later cause a crash.
*
* This test is adapted from a full reproducer which can be found here:
* https://github.com/tr3ee/CVE-2021-4204
*
* It's recommended to disable unprivileged eBPF by setting
* /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled. Also there is a
* specific fix for this issue:
*
* commit 64620e0a1e712a778095bd35cbb277dc2259281f
* Author: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* Date: Tue Jan 11 14:43:41 2022 +0000
*
* bpf: Fix out of bounds access for ringbuf helpers
*
* [1]: Depending on the ptr/reg type
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include "config.h"
#include "tst_test.h"
#include "tst_taint.h"
#include "tst_capability.h"
#include "lapi/bpf.h"
#include "bpf_common.h"
#define BUFSIZE 8192
static const char MSG[] = "Ahoj!";
static char *msg;
static int map_fd;
static uint32_t *key;
static uint64_t *val;
static char *log;
static union bpf_attr *attr;
static int load_prog(void)
{
int ret;
const struct bpf_insn prog_insn[] = {
// r0 = bpf_ringbuf_reserve(ctx->ringbuf_fd, 0xff0, 0)
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0xff0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0x00),
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve),
// if (r0 == NULL) exit(2)
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 2),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
// r0 = BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit(r0-(0x3008-0x38), BPF_RB_NO_WAKEUP)
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, (0x3008-0x38)),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 1),
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit),
/* exit(0) */
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN()
};
bpf_init_prog_attr(attr, prog_insn, sizeof(prog_insn), log, BUFSIZE);
ret = TST_RETRY_FUNC(bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, attr, sizeof(*attr)),
TST_RETVAL_GE0);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
if (ret != -1)
tst_brk(TBROK, "Invalid bpf() return value: %d", ret);
if (log[0] != 0)
tst_printf("%s\n", log);
return ret;
}
static void setup(void)
{
rlimit_bump_memlock();
memcpy(msg, MSG, sizeof(MSG));
}
static void run(void)
{
int prog_fd;
map_fd = bpf_map_create(&(union bpf_attr){
.map_type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF,
.key_size = 0,
.value_size = 0,
.max_entries = getpagesize()
});
tst_res(TINFO, "Trying to load eBPF with OOB write");
prog_fd = load_prog();
if (prog_fd == -1) {
tst_res(TPASS, "Failed verification");
return;
}
tst_res(TFAIL, "Loaded program with OOB write");
tst_res(TINFO, "Running eBPF with OOB");
bpf_run_prog(prog_fd, msg, sizeof(MSG));
tst_res(TINFO, "Ran eBPF");
SAFE_CLOSE(prog_fd);
}
static struct tst_test test = {
.setup = setup,
.test_all = run,
.min_kver = "5.8",
.taint_check = TST_TAINT_W | TST_TAINT_D,
.caps = (struct tst_cap []) {
TST_CAP(TST_CAP_DROP, CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
TST_CAP(TST_CAP_DROP, CAP_BPF),
{}
},
.bufs = (struct tst_buffers []) {
{&key, .size = sizeof(*key)},
{&val, .size = sizeof(*val)},
{&log, .size = BUFSIZE},
{&attr, .size = sizeof(*attr)},
{&msg, .size = sizeof(MSG)},
{}
},
.tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
{"linux-git", "64620e0a1e71"},
{"CVE", "CVE-2021-4204"},
{}
}
};